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As far as correlation does not mean causation, even it found a high correlation between 
some legal rights and economical parameters, it doesn’t mean that the latter are caused 
by legal dimensions only. However, if strong correlations exist between some legal 
rights and some socioeconomic outcomes, this is a good argument for policy makers 
to improve situation with proper legal rights which highly correlate with their first priority, 
that of socioeconomic policy aims. It’s important to know the real impact of improving 
legal rights for society to avoid overestimation or underestimation of this impact. Also, 
regarding the increase in the amount of different international ratings of legal rights, 
the question which is more reliable should be raised (“competition of ratings”). The 
correlation analysis shows that “economic oriented” legal rights such as like property 
and intellectual property are relatively more correlated with GDP per capita. On the other 
hand, political rights and civil freedoms such as the right not to be tortured unlawfully 
detained are relatively more correlated with social progress as a more complex and 
general socio-economic outcome. At the same time there is no high correlation observed 
between legal rights and life expectancy.
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1. Introduction
I’d like to give attention to some important arguments which explain why it is so 
important to know relationships between legal and socioeconomic dimensions:
First, although political rights and civil liberties are important, they can’t explain 
some economic development issues. Free and fair elections and civil liberties are 
necessary conditions for democracy, but they are unlikely to be sufficient for a full 
and consolidated democracy if unaccompanied by transparent and at least minimally 
efficient government, sufficient political participation and a supportive democratic 
political culture... the slowing of democratisation and rising disenchantment with the 
results of some political liberalisations appear to have a variety of causes. the pace 
of democratisation was bound to slow after “the easy cases” – eager-to-liberalise east 
central Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall and African regimes susceptible to outside 
pressure for political change. “hard cases” such as China and Middle East autocracies 
were always going to be a more difficult proposition. Autocrats have also learned 
how better to protect themselves; many of them preside over energy-rich states and 
have been strengthened by sustained high oil prices… A combination of double 
standards in foreign policy (autocrats can be good friends as well as foes) and growing 
infringements of civil liberties has reduced the effectiveness of western governments’ 
calls for democratisation... however, the direction of causality between democracy 
and income is also debateable. the standard modernisation hypothesis that economic 
development leads to, and/or is a necessary pre-condition for democracy, is no longer 
universally accepted. Instead it has been argued that the primary direction of causation 
runs from democracy to income (Acemoglu et al., 2005).1
Second, it’s unclear, how policies matter for economic growth. there is a significant 
controversy among academics and policy-makers about whether policies matter for 
economic growth. recently, Acemoglu et al. and Easterly have presented strong 
empirical evidence showing that policies do not play a significant role in the process 
of economic development. their key conclusion is that macroeconomic policies 
(monetary, fiscal and trade) have an explanatory power for the cross-country 
1  roberto rigobon & dani rodrik, Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating the 
interrelationships, 13(3) the Economics of transition 421 (2005); The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index 
of Democracy 2008, the Economist, at 1–3 (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://graphics.eiu.com/PdF/
democracy%20Index%202008.pdf. 
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variation in growth rates and income per capita only because they serve as proxies 
for institutions... what are the main determinants of economic growth? how can 
governments create an environment conducive to growth? the answers to these 
questions have changed fundamentally over the last decades. traditionally, the 
emphasis was placed on maintaining good macroeconomic policies such as low 
inflation, contained budget deficits and exchange rate stability. More recently, the 
consensus on the determinants of growth has de-emphasized macroeconomic 
policies in favor of focusing on the role of institutions, in a broader sense, as drivers 
of economic performance.2
Third, it’s important to understand whether democracy, some design of political 
institution, openness affect economic development. what are the fundamental 
determinants of the large income gaps that separate different regions of the world? 
Are high incomes the result of good institutions, or is it economic wealth that enables 
high-quality institutions? how does democracy affect economic development? Is 
openness to international trade good for development? For democracy? For the 
quality of institutions? what role do geographical constraints and advantages play in 
driving all these? what are the relative contributions to patterns of global inequality 
of exogenous determinants such as geography versus man-made factors such as 
institutions?3
Fourth, gdP is important but people want high quality of life not gdP as such. 
Money is not happiness, as was shown in the famous Bhutan example where people 
are poor but happy. sometimes it’s possible to have low gdP per capita but relatively 
high social progress. so I can’t test correlations with gdP per capita only. Moreover, 
sometimes gdP per capita is high but the majority of the population due to the 
political regime. For example, Equatorial guinea has a high gdP per capita but wealth 
is unevenly distributed. 
It has long been accepted that material wellbeing, as measured by gdP per person, 
cannot alone explain the broader quality of life in a country…But the approach has 
faced insurmountable difficulties in assigning monetary values to the various factors 
and intangibles that comprise a wider measure of socio-economic wellbeing. there 
have been numerous attempts to construct alternative, non-monetary indices of 
social and economic wellbeing by combining in a single statistic a variety of different 
factors that are thought to influence quality of life. the main problem in all these 
measures is selection bias and arbitrariness in the factors that are chosen to assess 
quality of life and, even more seriously, in assigning weights to different indicators 
(measured on a comparable and meaningful scale) to come up with a single synthetic 
measure. gdP, despite its drawbacks, at least has a clear, substantive meaning and 
2  Antonio Fatas & Ilian Mihov, Policy Volatility, Institutions and Economic Growth, 76(4) INsEAd and CEPr 
613 (2005).
3  rigobon & rodrik 2005, 534.
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prices are the objective weights for the goods and services that make it up (although 
there are also very big problems in estimating the purchasing-power parities that 
have to be used instead of market exchange rates in order to express countries’ 
incomes in the same currency). some researchers have invoked the uN’s universal 
declaration of human rights to identify the factors that need to be included in 
a quality-of-life measure. But, even if accepted as a starting point, that still does 
not point to precise indicators or how they are to be weighted. A technocratic and 
unsatisfying device that is sometimes used is to resort to “expert opinion.”4 
harvard professor Michael Porter, who is a leading authority on company strategy 
and the competitiveness of nations and regions, says it is ridiculous to be measuring 
success purely on the idea of growth at a time when countries are facing massive 
social upheavals. he is also critical of previous work that seeks to integrate wellbeing 
and happiness into the economic agenda. he believes past indices have failed 
because they have tried to mix economic metrics with social metrics. the sPI only 
looks at social and environmental considerations and therefore gives them authority 
in their own right and allows them to be compared and contrasted with traditional 
economic measures. he says that “the Arab spring of 2011 and the challenges in 
Mexico over the last decade, have illustrated the shortcomings of economic growth 
as a proxy for social progress… In both business and economic development, our 
understanding of success has been incomplete... Previous efforts to go beyond 
economic measurement alone have laid important groundwork, but we need 
a more holistic, comprehensive, and rigorous approach. the social Progress Index 
is an attempt to address these gaps and opportunities… social progress depends 
on the policy choices, investments, and implementation capabilities of multiple 
stakeholders – government, civil society, and business. Action needs to be catalysed 
at country level. By informing and motivating those stakeholders to work together 
and develop a more holistic approach to development, I am confident that social 
progress will accelerate.”5
Fifth, a more precise and integrated theory of human rights is necessary. we hope 
that someday scholars and policymakers will pay as much attention to government 
respect to economic, social, and cultural human rights as they have paid to respect for 
rights of physical integrity. despite the recognition of other types of human rights, in 
international human rights law, until recently, most international nongovernmental 
organizations INgos, including Amnesty International and human rights watch, 
have focused their reports and activities almost exclusively on identifying and 
remedying government violations of the physical integrity of the person. Currently, 
4  The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Quality-of-Life Index, the world in 2005, the Economist, at 1 (Nov. 10, 
2016), available at https://www.economist.com/media/pdf/QuALIty_oF_LIFE.pdf.
5  Michael Porter Unveils New Health and Happiness Index, the Economist, April 11, 2013 (Nov. 10, 2016), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/michael-porter-health-happiness-
index.
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there is a movement towards an integrated human rights approach that reflects 
a belief in the complementarity, universality, and indivisibility of all rights.6 
In one of the last uN papers related to international rankings methodology 
the importance of the indicators of governance, rule of law, peacebuilding, 
violence and conflict and human rights was underlined. growing interest in their 
quantitative measures and inter national levels, has fostered a large number of data 
initiatives among official and non-official data producers. work on standardization 
and harmonization of concepts and methods now underway provides a strong 
foundation for nu merical target-setting and subsequent selection of indicators. 
Basic standard methodologies have been developed, for example, for victimization 
surveys, violence against women, homicide, mortality statistics by cause of death, 
human rights, rule of law, and there is considerable ongoing.7
Also I should say some words about the general difference in mentality of lawyers 
and politicians. Lawyers are more idealists in that for them the rule of law is of intrinsic 
value. At the same time politicians are more oriented towards socio-economic 
indicators (gdP per capita, life expectancy, unemployment, social welfare etc.). so, 
if the lawyers aim is to convince politicians to give more attention to legal rights, 
lawyers should prove to politicians that legal success indicators highly correlate with 
economic success if it’s really so. 
Also it’s important that in general, politicians have much more trust in overseas 
rankings, considering them to be more independent. the difficulty here is that, 
sometimes, institutions who produce ratings do not have permanent staff worldwide 
so they authorize domestic experts to create ratings. so finally ratings are created by 
domestic experts who sometimes overestimate their country (a good example is the 
enormously high scores of rwanda in the wEF global Competitiveness report).
2. Methodology of Our Research
I used correlation analysis where y (dependent variables) are socio-economic 
outcomes. X (independent variables) are legal rights.
Y: dependent variables used. As socio-economic indicators I decided to use two 
objective socio-economic parameters (Nominal gdP per capita in current prices and 
Life expectancy) and one complex rating (social Progress Index).
1. Nominal gdP per capita in current prices in 2012 and 2013. data available for 
204 countries. I used the world Bank data if available and the uN statistic division 
data for a very few countries where the world Bank data was unavailable. 
6  david Cingranelli & david richards, CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 32 human rights Quarterly 395, 
416 (2010).
7  Statistics and Indicators for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, uN system task team on the Post-
2015 uN development Agenda, the uN, at 7 (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/uNtt_Monitoringreport_wEB.pdf.
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2. Life expectancy data was taken from the world health statistics 2014. Part 3 
world health Indicators.8 data available for 193 countries.
3. Also I used a dependent variable: one complex social Progress Index created in 
2013 by professor Michael Porter, harvard Business school. It measures 132 countries 
using combination of 52 indicators in the areas of basic human needs, foundations 
of wellbeing, and opportunity show the relative performance of nations. I make 
a reservation that Life Expectancy was a one of the indicators used for creation of this 
Index. however, the weight of this indicator in the common rating is minor. so, I believe 
that it can’t significantly bias our conclusions based on separate research of correlations 
of the Life expectancy and social Progress Index with the same legal indicators. 
X: independent variables used. I decided to select for our research ranks of 
legal rights created by well-respected institutions/scholars. I apply the minimum 
representativeness conditions that data for at least 90 countries from all geographical 
parts of the world should be available. so I skipped both ratings based on research of 
less than 90 countries and/or all countries from one region. Also, I try to use ratings 
which include both developed and developing countries with the one exception of 
the Bertelsmann stiftung’s transformation Index which measures 129 developing 
countries.
Finally I selected and used legal parts of the 8 following international rankings:
1. the global Competitiveness report 2013–2014 by the world Economic Forum.9 
Measures 148 countries. Based on survey of local business executives. 
2. the rule of Law Index 2014 by the world Justice Project.10 Measures 97 countries. 
Based on a survey of 1000 random individuals in the 3 largest cities of the country (in 
reality 850–1152 individuals were asked in 2011–2013) plus survey of local experts, 
on average 24 experts per country. however, the amount of experts in each country 
is not disclosed. 
3. the Bertelsmann stiftung’s transformation Index (BtI) 2014.11 Measures 129 
developing countries. Based on a survey of 250 local experts from each country. 
4. the Cingranelli and richards (CIrI) human rights dataset 2012.12 Measures 
192 countries. Based on analysis of information about human rights violations from 
8  World Health Statistics 2014, the world health organization (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://www.
who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/2014/en/.
9  The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014, the world Economic Forum (Nov. 10, 2016), available 
at https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014.
10  WJP Rule of Law Index 2015, the world Justice Project (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://worldjustice 
project.org/rule-of-law-index.
11  Transformation Index (BTI) 2014, the Bertelsmann stiftung (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://www.
bti-project.org/bti-home/.
12  Human Rights Dataset 2012, the Cingranelli and richards (CIrI) human rights data Project (Nov. 10, 
2016), available at http://www.humanrightsdata.com/.
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official and non-official sources such as the number of political prisoners and the 
number of cases of torture.
5. democracy Index 2012 by the Economist Intelligence unit Limited 2013.13 
Measures 167 countries. Based on analytical research of published information plus 
expert opinions. Clear information about the number and selection of experts is 
not found. 
6. worldwide governance Indicators by the world Bank. the 2013 update rule 
of Law subsection.14 Measures 215 countries. Based on centralised analysis of 32 
sources, the majority of which are ratings and indexes based on expert surveys but 
part of them are based on public opinion surveys.15
7. Freedom in the world 2013–2014 by Freedom house.16 Measures 194 countries. 
Centralised team of 90 international experts was hired for the project who analysed 
sources related to different countries. 
8. the global Innovation Index 2014.17 Measures 143 countries. Joint project of 
Cornell university, INsEAd, and the world Intellectual Property organization (wIPo) 
and their knowledge Partners. 
Even though ratings include the majority of countries in the world, some countries 
are always absent. In our research I compare results of different ratings based on 
different samples of countries. so N (sample size, countries) differs for different 
combinations (y, X) in our summarized statistic (see table 1). As I mentioned above, 
to improve validity of our results I excluded from research all rankings with less than 
90 countries, considering them not sufficiently representative. 
Also it’s worth pointing out that a new The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators 
Implementation Guide and Project Tools18 appeared in 2011. It offered a new advanced 
methodology of quantitative estimations in the sphere of comparison of legal systems. 
However, it hasn’t been used in practise yet. This creates a potentially interesting niche 
for future research and cooperation with UN. 
one can compute correlations by different ways. In our research I found out that 
sometimes polynomial and linear r2 were approximately the same. however, in the 
13  Democracy Index 2012, the Economist (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/
images/democracy-Index-2012.pdf.
14  Worldwide Governance Indicators, the world Bank (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://info.worldbank.
org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
15  daniel kaufmann et al., The Worldwide Governance Indicators Methodology and Analytical Issues, world 
Bank Policy research working Paper No. 5430 (september 2010).
16  Freedom in the World 2013–2014, Freedom house (Nov. 10, 2016), available at https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.vMotkMnudEs.
17  The Global Innovation Index 2014, Cornell university, INsEAd, the wIPo (Nov. 10, 2016), available at 
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/content.aspx?page=gII-home.
18  Rule of Law Indicators Implementation Guide and Project Tools, the united Nations (Nov. 10, 2016), 
available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf.
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majority of our data massive distributions polynomial r2 was much higher than linear. 
At the same time, there was no single case where in the linear model correlation was 
higher to compare with the polynomial model. one could make a mistake if looking 
at low linear correlation level to make a general conclusion about the low correlation 
level. In many cases polynomial model could provide a correct response of medium 
or high level of correlation. so finally I decided to use polynomial correlation as 
a basis for our research.
I recognize that some indices I researched are partly based on other indices which 
are also included in our research. For example, the rule of Law Index is a one of 32 
sources for creation of the global Competitiveness report. I are unable to avoid 
some biases caused by mutual influence of indexes to each other. But I believe that 
proper distortion is not significant. For example it’s clear that the “contribution” of one 
“ingredient” to the “whole pie” is very unlikely to not be significant compared with the 
total contribution of the other thirty-one other ingredients and “poison a pie.”
to illustrate our methodology I’ll demonstrate here in detail one rank from the 
global Competitiveness report 2013–2014: judicial independence.
1.06 Judicial independence
In your country, to what extent is the judiciary independent from influences 
of members of government, citizens or firms? [1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely 
independent]
| 2012–13 weighted average
For the polynomial function like y = ax2 + bx + c I always got positive “a” coefficient 
and r > 0 (positive sign of correlation coefficient). 
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Each additional increase of X by one point, compared with previous one point 
X increase, is associated with 2*a higher increase of y. Also one can say that f’’(x) = 
2a as far as the second derivative measures how the rate of change of a quantity 
is itself changing. unlike a linear function, it’s impossible to measure an absolute 
change of y associated with 1 unit change of X because it is different at each point 
of X. But I can measure the acceleration of change. In general, the lower difference 
in r2 between polynomial and linear models the lower the module of coefficient 
“a” in polynomial equation. only in a very few cases I got similar r2 for linear and 
polynomial model. In those cases coefficient “a” is very low. 
In our research I consider the following arbitrary correlations: 
r2 > 0.5625 high correlation (so if r>0.75)
0.25 <r2 < 0.5625 medium correlation (so if 0.5 < r < 0.75) 
r2 < 0.25 low correlation (so if r < 0.5)
table 1
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WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM.  
THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 
REPORT
Sample size (countries) N = 147 N = 147 N = 122 N = 155
PILLAR 1 INSTITUTIONS, Aggregated 0.64 0.638 0.456 0.271 hhMM
Ethical behaviour of firms 0.672 0.672 0.471 0.259 hhMM
Intellectual property protection 0.661 0.657 0.484 0.262 hhMM
Irregular payment and bribes 0.659 0.658 0.602 0.4 hhhM
diversion of public funds 0.653 0.654 0.419 0.279 hhMM
Property rights 0.632 0.631 0.418 0.302 hhMM
reliability of police services 0.627 0.623 0.469 0.324 hhMM
Judicial independence 0.615 0.612 0.426 0.265 hhMM
Favouritism in decisions  
of government officials 
0.492 0.489 0.282 0.174 MMML
Efficiency of legal framework  
in challenging regulations
0.487 0.495 0.291 0.158 MMML
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Burden of government regulation 0.481 0.481 0.265 0.139 MMML
strength of auditing and reporting 
standards 
0.471 0.469 0.502 0.289 MMMM
Public trust in politicians 0.468 0.466 0.167 0.122 MMLL
Efficacy of corporate boards 0.462 0.460 0.305 0.136 MMML
Protection of minority shareholders 
interests
0.396 0.394 0.28 0.146 MMML
organized crime 0.389 0.390 0.297 0.206 MMML
Business cost of crime and violence 0.386 0.385 0.275 0.183 MMML
transparency of government 
policymaking
0.385 0.388 0.311 0.139 MMML
wastefulness of government spending 0.259 0.257 0.083 0.063 MMLL
Business cost of terrorism 0.141 0.143 0.295 0.104 LLML
Burden of government regulation 0.138 0.139 0.049 0.079 LLLL
strength of investor protection  
(max = 10!)
0.074 0.074 0.13 0.091 LLLL
WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT THE RULE 
OF LAW INDEX
Sample size (countries) N = 98 N = 98 N = 90 N = 97
ruLE oF LAw Aggregated 0.83 0.836 0.74 0.43 hhhM
Constraints of government powers 
subrating 
0.747 0.759 0.728 0.314 hhhM
order and security subrating 0.813 0.818 0.434 0.418 hhMM
Absence of corruprtion subrating 0.755 0.756 0.729 0.496 hhhM
open government subrating 0.694 0.705 0.701 0.409 hhhM
Fundamental rights subrating 0.459 0.458 0.71 0.325 MMhM
regulatory enforcement subrating 0.821 0.822 0.705 0.405 hhhM
Civil justice subrating 0.762 0.768 0.594 0.298 hhhM
Criminal justice subrating 0.777 0.784 0.609 0.322 hhhM
The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
Transformation Index (BTI)
Sample size (countries) N = 128 N = 128 N = 106 N = 127
Political transformation Aggregated 0.023 0.025 0.433 0.119 LLML
stateness. subrating of Political 
transformation 
0.101 0.087 0.517 0.216 LLML
Political participation. 
subrating of Political transformation
0.039 0.04 0.393 0.109 LLML
rule of law. subrating of Political 
transformation
0.036 0.088 0.42 0.119 LLML
stability of democratic institutions. 
subrating of Political transformation
0.063 0.066 0.374 0.123 LLML
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL    Volume IV (2016) Issue 4 56
Political and social integration. 
subrating of Political transformation
0.027 0.029 0.395 0.135 LLML
The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Data Project 
Sample size (countries) N = 190 N = 190 N = 133 N = 189
Physical Integrity rights Index 
(aggregated 4 following rows)
0.281 0.246 0.478 0.188 MLML
government respect for 
disappearance
0.028 0.031 0.083 0.083 LLLL
government respect for extrajudicial 
killing
0.144 0.157 0.254 0.146 LLML
government respect for political 
imprisonment
0.102 0.111 0.351 0.109 LLML
government respect for torture 0.25 0.264 0.304 0.145 MMML
Empowerment rights Index 
Aggregated 7 following rights)
0.107 0.122 0.444 0.182 LLML
Assembly & Association 0.091 0.101 0.314 0.114 LLLL
Foreign Movement 0.047 0.05 0.178 0.143 LLLL
domestic Movement 0.049 0.053 0.203 0.092 LLLL
speech 0.013 0.016 0.14 0.067 LLLL
Electoral self-determination 0.101 0.106 0.279 0.166 LLML
religion 0.019 0.022 0.061 0.003 LLLL
workers’ rights 0.06 0.078 0.15 0.068 LLLL
women’s Economic rights 0.394 0.413 0.474 0.344 MMMM
women’s Political rights 0.037 0.044 0.032 0.015 LLLL
Independence of the Judiciary 0.2 0.228 0.417 0.202 LLML
THE ECONOMIST DEMOCRACY 
INDEX. DEMOCRACY  
AT A STANDSTILL
Sample size (countries) N = 162 N = 162 N = 132 N = 162
democracy Index Aggregated 0.452 0.445 0.689 0.384 MMhM
Electoral process and pluralism. 
subranking of the democracy Index
0.235 0.232 0.607 0.338 MMhM
Functioning of government.
subranking of the democracy Index
0.405 0.4 0.624 0.406 MMhM
Political participation subranking of 
the democracy Index
0.377 0.378 0.422 0.25 MMMM
Political Culture subranking of the 
democracy Index
0.483 0.476 0.484 0.256 MMMM
Civil liberties. subranking of the 
democracy Index subranking of the 
democracy Index
0.276 0.273 0.655 0.374 MMhM
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THE WORLD BANK Worldwide 
Governance Indicators
Sample size (countries) N = 166 N = 166 N = 132 N = 193
voice and Accountability participating 
in selecting their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media
0.403 0.373 0.708 0.364 MMhM
Political stability and Absence  
of violence/terrorism likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized  
or overthrown by unconstitutional  
or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism
0.356 0.347 0.535 0.25 MMhM
government effectiveness quality  
of public services, the quality  
of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation,  
and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies
0.645 0.632 0.801 0.488 hhhM
regulatory Quality  
ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development
0.634 0.608 0.732 0.43 hhhM
rule of Law  
confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence
0.658 0.539 0.708 0.441 hhhM
Control of Corruption
reflects perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well 
as “capture of the state by elites and 
private interests”
0.623 0.603 0.662 0.426 hhhM
FREEDOM HOUSE
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 
Sample size (countries) N = 182 N = 182 N = 133 N = 188
Political rights 0.215 0.191 0.42 0.279 LLMM
Civil liberties 0.265 0.274 0.6 0.297 MMhM
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THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 
2014
Sample size (countries) N = 142 N = 142 N = 133 N = 142
regulatory quality 0.633 0.636 0.733 0.475 hhhM
rule of law 0.716 0.721 0.69 0.434 hhhM
the global Competitiveness report 2013–2014 by the world Economic Forum 
(1 aggregated plus 21 subratings). Correlations of measured legal rights are signi-
ficantly higher with gdP per capita than with social Progress Index for 1 aggregated 
and 19/21 subratings. In two subrating cases the situation is opposite, however r2 
is low in these cases. Correlation with life expectancy as usual is medium in cases 
where correlation with gdP per capita is high, but low in other cases.
the rule of Law Index 2014 by the world Justice Project (1 aggregated plus 8 
subratings). Correlations of measured legal rights are significantly higher with gdP 
per capita than with social Progress Index for 1 aggregated and 6/8 subratings. In the 
other 2 subratings, the situation is opposite, but the difference between r2 is minimal 
and unlikely to be statistically significant. In the majority of cases, correlation with 
gdP per capita is high, with social Progress Index and Life expectancy is medium. 
the Bertelsmann stiftung’s transformation Index (BtI) (1 aggregated plus 
subratings). Correlations of measured legal rights are significantly lower with gdP 
per capita than with social Progress Index. All correlations with gdP per capita and 
life expectancy are low, all correlations with Porter Index are medium. 
the Cingranelli and richards (CIrI) human rights data Project (2 aggregated 
which combine 11 subratingss and 3 separate ratings). the picture is very similar 
to the Bertelsmann stiftung’s transformation Index (BtI). Correlations of measured 
legal rights are significantly lower with gdP per capita than with social Progress 
Index. All correlations with gdP per capita and life expectancy are low, correlations 
with Porter Index are low or sometimes medium. Exceptions: government respect 
for torture where all correlations are medium except with life expectancy where low; 
women’s Economic rights where all correlations are medium. 
democracy Index 2012 by the Economist Intelligence unit Limited 2013 
(1 aggregated plus 5 subratings). Correlations of measured legal rights are significantly 
lower with gdP per capita than with social Progress Index. All correlations with gdP 
per capita and life expectancy are medium. Correlations with social Progress Index 
are high or medium. 
worldwide governance Indicators by the world Bank. (the 2013 update. 5 indi-
cators). Correlations of measured legal rights are lower with gdP per capita than 
with social Progress Index but not significantly. All correlations with social Progress 
Index are high, all correlations with Life expectancy are medium. Correlations with 
gdP per capita are high or medium. 
KYRYLO MOLODYKO 59
Freedom in the world 2013–2014 by Freedom house (2 aggregated ratings). 
Correlations of measured political rights with both gdP per capita and social Progress 
Index are significantly lower compared with Civil liberties in the same ratings. All 
correlations with life expectancy are medium. 
the global Innovation Index 2014 (2 ratings). Correlations of measured legal rights 
with both gdP per capita and social Progress Index are high and not significantly 
different to each other. All correlations with life expectancy are low.
table 2
Top 10 Correlations Between Legal Rights and Development
(R2 in Brackets)
Nominal GDP per capita  
in current prices (average 
of R2 in 2012 and 2013)
Social Progress Index 
(Porter) Life expectancy 
the world Justice Project 
rule of law aggregated 
(0.833)
the world Justice Project 
order and security (0.816)
the world Justice Project 
the regulatory enforcement 
(0.822)
the world Justice Project 
Absence of corruprtion 
(0.756)
the world Justice Project. 
Constraints of government 
powers (0.753)
the world Justice Project 
Criminal justice (0.781)
the world Justice Project 
Civil justice (0.765)
global Innovation Index 
rule of law (0.719)
the world Justice Project 
open government (0.699)
the global Competitiveness 
report. Ethical behaviour of 
firms (0.672)
the world Bank. 
government Effectiveness 
(0.801)
the world Justice Project 
rule of law aggregated 
(0.74)
the global Innovation Index. 
regulatory Quality (0.733)
the world Bank. regulatory 
quality (0.732)
the world Justice Project. 
Absence of corruption 
(0.729)
the world Justice Project. 
Constraints of government 
powers (0.728)
the world Justice Project. 
Fundamental rights (0.71)
the world Bank. rule of law 
(0.708)
the world Bank. voice and 
accountability (0.708)
the world Justice Project. 
regulatory enforcement 
(0.705)
the world Justice Project 
Absence of corruption 
(0.496)
the world Bank government 
effectiveness (0.488)
global Innovation Index 
regulatory quality (0.475)
the world Bank. rule of law 
(0.441)
global Innovation Index. 
rule of law (0.434)
the world Bank. regulatory 
quality (0.43)
the world Justice Project. 
rule of law aggregated 
(0.43)
the world Bank. Control of 
corruption (0.426)
the world Justice Project. 
order and security (0.418)
the world Justice Project. 
open government (0.409)
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3. Conclusion
In general there are no high correlations between score in legal ratings and life 
expectancy. Probably non-legal factors have the major impact on life expectancy. 
so I should avoid speaking of legal improvements as the best way to increase life 
expectancy. “Economic oriented” legal rights such as like property and intellectual 
property are relatively more correlated with gdP per capita. Political rights, civil 
freedoms such as the right not to be tortured or unlawfully detained are more 
correlated with social Progress. results of the Cingranelli and richards (CIrI) human 
rights data and the Project transformation Index (BtI) have relatively low correlations 
with both gdP per capita, Porter Index and life expectancy. As far as these 2 ratings 
measure a lot of common parameters with other 6 ratings I researched, it’s possible 
to make an assumption the methodological shortcomings of the Cingranelli and 
richards (CIrI) human rights data and the transformation Index (BtI). In CIrI it is 
likely caused by use of an inappropriate scale (0-1-2 or 0-1-2-3 points are given only 
which leads to equal score given to significantly distinctive countries). As usual, 
general questions about legal dimensions, such as an estimate of the rule of law 
or the whole of fundamental rights, give higher correlations about more narrow 
legal rights.
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